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r:;J THE SUPRE}1E C0URT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
FERRIN DOUGLAS GLINES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16659 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ferrin Douglas Glines, was convicted 
before the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, in and for 
Layton, Utah of the crime of Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol, in violation of Section 41-6-44, Layton Mun-
icipal Code. Upon appeal to the Second Judicial District 
Court, that judgement of conviction was upheld by the Honorable 
J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, presiding. From that judgement of 
conviction, the defendant brings this direct appeal pursuant 
to the terms and provisions of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah solely and expressly to test 
the Constitutional validity and construction of Layton Mun-
, cin"l Code 41-6-44. 
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DISPOSITion IM THE LO~ffi~ COURT 
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the 
crime of Driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation 
of Layton Municipal Code, Section 41-6-44. Subsequently, the 
trial court sentenced appeallant to serve a term of six-month: 
in the Davis County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT on APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment 
of the trial court upon grounds that Section 41-6-44, Layton 
Municipal Code is invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
in the Layton Circuit Court on Monday, May 7, 1979 at the hour 
of 10: 00 o'clock a .m. before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornabi 
Circuit Court Judge. The matter was before the Court for tri• 
of the defendant for the offense of D. U. I. The matter was 
prosecuted under a Layton City Ordinance. At the conclusion 
of evidence in the matter, Defendant moved the Court to dismi;: 
the matter upon grounds that Layton City lacks Constitutional· 
or statutory authority to enact a D. U. I. ordinance. Subsequef! 
to oral argument, the Court denied such Motion and Defendant 
was there upon convicted of the offense of D. U. I. under Layt 
-2-
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Municipal Code, Section 41-6-44 and sentenced to a term of 
six-months in the Davis County Jail. From that Judgement 
of conviction, Defendant brought direct Appeal to the Second 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer presiding. 
On August 9, 1979, the Court affirmed Mr. Glines conviction. 
From that final judgement. Defendant brings this direct appeal. 
-3-
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ARGUMEllT 
POINT I 
SECTION 41-6-44, LAYTOM HlHTICIPAL CODE IS 
INVALID SINCE MUNICIPALITIES ARE NOT EMPOWERED 
BY STATUTE TO ENACT ORDINANCES PROHIBITING D.U 
In the matter now before the Court, the Defendant, 
Ferrin Douglas Glines, was charged by Complaint with the 
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor 
in violation of Section 41-6-44 of the Revised Ordinances ~ 
Layton City. Section 41-6-44 was enacted pursuant to the 
authority conferred upon the City of Layton and other Mun-
icipalities by statute and, specifically, by Utah Code An· 
notated Section 41-6-43 providing, in pertinent part, as foL 
(a) Local authorities may by ordinance provide 
that it shalll be unlawful for any person 
who is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor or is an habitual user or under the 
influence of any narcotic drugs or any other 
drug to a degree which rendered him incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle to drive or be 
in actual physical control of any vehicle, 
for the use of chemical tests and for evid-
entiary pre-sumptions, and for penalties . 
therefore as a first offense consistent with 
Section 41-6-44. 
The above-cited statute was repealed by the Utah Stati 
Legislature (Laws 1978, Ch. 33, Section 54) on Januarv 28, 
1978, effective March 30, 1978, and said repeal of the stat· 
d. D f d nt urges utory authority to enact D.U.I. or inances, e en a • 
f R · d o~~r operates to invalidate Section 41-6-44 o the ,evise 
of Layton City. (The Section has since been re-enacted but 
-4- d 
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> 
such re-enactment was not effective untill July 1, 1979) 
It is well established as a matter of law in this 
jurisdiction that municipalities possess none of the elements 
of Sovereignty and that they are" creatures of statute", i.e. 
that they possess only those powers conferred upon them by 
the State of Utah or by statutory enactment. Nasfell v. 
Ogden City, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 507 (1952); Salt Lake 
City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504,124 P. 2d 537 (1942); Moss v. 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah 2d 60, 
261 P. 2d 234 (1923); Lark v. Whitehead, 28 Utah 2d 343, 502 
p 2d 557 (1972). 
In Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 507 
(1952) the Supreme Court of Utah stated that: 
We are committed to the principle that 
cities have none of the elements of sovereignty, 
that "any fair, reasonable substantial doubt 
concerning the existence of the power is resolved 
by the Courts against the corporation (city) 
and the power denied .... That grants of power 
to cities are strictly construed to the exclusion 
of implied powers not reasonably necessary in 
carrying out the purposes of the express powers 
granted. (249 P. 2d at 508) 
In ~Tasfell, the Court held that Ogden had no power to 
pass an "ordinance declaring the presence of a vehicle, parked 
in violation of any ordinance, on any public street in the city, 
prima f acie evidence that the registered owner of such vehicle 
committed or authorized such violation ..... " 
In Salt' Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P. 2d 
537 (1942), the Defendant was charged with the violation of a 
·.:1ty ordinance which prescribed the hours during which barber 
shops could remain open. In striking down the ordinance the 
-5-
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Court said: 
I~ has been :e~eatedly stated by this 
Court that a municipal corporation oosse 
d . h f - , sses< an can exercise t e allowing powers and · 
other; First, those granted in express wo~ 
sec?nd. those necessarily or fairly implied i~, 
or.incident to the powers expressly grant~; 
third, those essential to the accomplishment 
of the d7clared objects and purposes of the 
corporation, ... not simply convenient but 
indispensible." (124) P. 2d at 538) 
The above principles have been consistently strictly 
construed by the Utah Supreme Court. In Moss, County Attorm 
ex rel. State Tax Conunission v. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City, et al, Utah 2d 60 261 P. 2d 961 (1953), the 
Court reiterated: 
This Court has not favored the extention 
of the powers of the city by implication, and 
the only modification of such doctrine is when 
the power is one which is necessarily implied. 
Unless this requirement is met, the power 
cannot be deduced from any consideration of 
convenience of necessity, or desirability of 
such result, and no doubtful influence from 
other powers granted or from ambiguous or 
uncertain provisions of the law would be . 
sufficient to sustain such authority. (citation 
omitted) (216 P. 2d at 964) 
In Layton City v. Speth, Supra, a case in which counsi 
for Defendant personally participated, the Utah Supreme Gour: 
in striking down a city ordinance, again stated: 
r.rants of nower to cities are strictlv construe~I 
to the exclusion of implied powers (578 P. 2d ,_ 
The above cited cases and authoritv to the contrarv n.· 
withstanding, it is believed that Respondent will attempt t: 
rely heri=dn uoon the case of Salt Lake Citv v. ~ ;, ·9?Uc 
133, 93~, P. 2d 671 (1939) S.L.C. v. Kusse was a 
-6-
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1939 decision in which the Utah Supreme Court held that municipalities 
have authority pursuant to a general powers statute ( U.C.A. 15-8-84, 
now U.C.A. 10-8-84) to enact a D.U.I. ordinance. Appeallant believes 
that Respondent's reliance is misplaced. 
To begin, Kusse predates the repealed enabling statute, U.C.A. 
41-6-43, by two years. Section 41-6-43, U.C.A. was first enacted 
in 1941. Kusse came down in 1939. Secondly,41-6-43 was a specific 
legislative grant of authority to enact D.U.I. ordinances, whereas 
the Section construed in Kusse , 15-8-84 (now 10-8-84), was a general 
oowers ordinance. The clear thrust of all of the above cited cases 
and authority is that a specific grant of authority controls and 
delimits a general grant and, by implication, where the specific 
authority has been expressly repealed one cannot ressurrect it 
under the guise of general authority. Thus, although one might 
subsume the power to enact D.U.I. ordinances under a general oowers 
statute as this Court once did in Kusse , once there has been a 
specific grant of such authority and then such specific grant 
has been repealed, as here, by the State Legislature , the only 
reasonable conclusion available is that the legislature intended 
to preempt thereby the authority of municipalities to enact D.U.I. 
ordinances. Further, counsel submits that all cases herein cited 
postdate Kusse on the issue of the authority of cities to enact 
ordinances and to the extent that Kusse conflicts with such 
cases or seems to conflict with such cases, its ruling has been 
clearly and expressly modified or even overuled by such cases. 
-7-
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Applying the rationale of the above-cited cases and 
authority to the facts in the instant case, it is clear that 
the Layton City Ordinance must fall since the statutory author:: 
for the enactment of said ordinance has been repealed. Absent 
an express statutory grant of authority, the law is well settle. 
in this jurisdiction that municipalities lack the authority 
to enact and enforce crimminal ordinances. The policy of this 
restrictive interpretation as stated in Nasfell is both sou~ 
and well settled. "The rule promotes a wholesome, uniform orde:. 
amoung the municipalities of the state. Its wisdom is not ooe~. 
to question at this date, and we ought not depart from it light: 
( 249 P. at 509) 
POINT II 
SECTION 41-6-44, LAYTON MUNICIPAL CODE, IS INVALID 
SINCE THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS EFE 
IVELY PREEMPTED THAT AREA OF LEGISLATION. 
Layton City is further prohibited from enacting and en-
forcing Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, in the instant 
case, on the theory of pre-emption. Layton City effectively 
intrudes upon the area of legislative enactment pre-emted by 
the State of Utah pursuant to Section 41-6-44. U.C.A., (1953), 
which prohibits Driving Under the Influence and which, by recen: 
revision, punishes said offense as a Class "A" ~isdemeanor 
under certain circumstances. 
In a case involving prostitution, Salt Lake City v. ~ 
10 Utah 2d 254, 430 Pd2d 371 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court he:: 
d lete la• that where the State has enacted comprehensive an comp 
pertaining to an offense, it has pre-empted the field. 
-8-
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further held that a Municipality or City has authority to en;i_-:". 
Jrdinances only in those areas where the State has given authoritv and a 
specific grant of authority is not grounds to argue that a city 
may also prohibit the same conduct. As stated in Sutter; supra: 
It may he, and is, contended that the ordinance 
in 9uestion is only carrying out the general 
policy of the state as reflected by the legislative 
enactment making it an offense against the state 
law for any person to knowingly have in his possession 
without authority intoxicating liquors within the 
state. But the policy of the state cannot control 
in determining the powers of a municioalitv. 
(216 P. 2d at 237) · · 
Applying the above-cited rationale, the Utah Supreme 
Court recently struck down a city ordinance prohibiting possession 
of a controlled substance. In the decision in Layton City v. 
Speth, Supra, the Court specifically noted that Municipalities 
are empowered only to enact ordinances creating offenses punishable 
as Class "B" Misdemeanors whereas the State has authority to 
affix more serious penalties for violations of its statutes. Thus, 
where the £ity and State have both enacted laws proscribing certain 
conduct, the Court notes, the fact that the State has set forth 
a penalty for the offense that exceeds the penalty that the City 
might lawfully impose, consitutes an indication that the State 
has intended to pre-empt the field and renders the City Ordinance 
invalid. 
In its decision, the Court, Chief Justice,Ellett 
speaking said: 
The State of Utah has enacted statutes controlling 
the sale, gift, or use of controlle~ substances. 
Subsection (2) (a) (ii) of U.C.A., 1953, 58-37-8 
contain the exact language of the ordinance ~et 
out above. The City had not power or authority 
to copy the statute in its ordinance. 
-9-
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If the City could enact an ordinance cov . 
the same offenses as those set out in the sta~~~n 
the:e would be a problem. A violation of the · 
ordii;.ance would only be a misdemeanor punishable 
by fine not to exceed six months while the state 
statute declares the offense to be punishable a 
follows: s 
(a) For the first offense, a fine of 
$299.00 or jail not to exceed six months, or both; 
(b) For the second offense, a fine of 
$1, 000. 00 or jail not to exceed one year, or both' 
(c) For the third or subsequent conviction 
imprisionment in the Utah State Prison for not ' 
more than five years. 
The City ordinance penalty would apply to 
a person who was a multiple off ender as well as 
to a first offender for the ordinance applies 
simply to anyone who knowingly permits his car 
to be occupied by persons using controlled 
substances therein. 
The conviction of Mr. Speth for violating 
that ordinance must be set aside. The judgment 
is reversed. No costs are awarded. (378 P. 2d at 
Applying the above cited authority to the instant 
case, it is clear that the legislature intended at the time oft·; 
repeal of 41-6-43, to pre-empt municipalities from the field of 
D.U.I. legislation. This is apparent since (1) the enabling 
statute was expressly repealed, and (2) the state has chosen 
to punish D. U. I. in certain instances as a Class "A" Misdemeanc: 
and said penalty is beyond the authority of cities to enact. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, is invalic 
since Municipalities are not empowered by Statute to enact 
ordinances prohibiting Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
-10-
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Further, Section 41-6-44. Layton Municipal Code, is 
invalid since the Legislature of the State of Utah has effect-
ively preempted that area of legislation. For such reasons, 
this Court should reverse the verdict and judgment of the trial 
and appellate courts, declaring therewith that Layton 
Municipal Code 41-6-44 is constitutionally invalid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellant was 
duly served on counsel for the Respondent, Bruce C. Barton, 
Layton City Attorney, 437 North Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah, 
by hand delivering three (3) copies thereof this \~~ day of 
tfovember, 1979. 
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